The majority of independent nations today were part of empires in 1945. Using bilateral trade data from 1948 to 2006, we examine the effect of independence on post-colonial trade. On average, there is little short run effect of trade with the colonizer (metropole). However, after three decades trade declines more than 60%.
Introduction
The dismantling of European empires after World War II led to sweeping changes in the governance of developing countries in Africa and Asia. Recent research in economics has investigated the long-run consequences of colonial rule. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the British endowed their colonies with a legal system that produces superior economic outcomes. Acemoglu et al. (2001 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2002 find that colonizers were more likely to establish pro-growth institutions in sparsely populated areas with lower settler mortality. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that 50 years after India abolished land revenue systems imposed in the mid-19th by British rules, their "institutional overhang" can be seen in agricultural productivity differences. In this paper, we investigate a different legacy of colonial rule: the bias in post-colonial bilateral trade patterns.
Algeria's trade with France offers prima facie evidence of large post-colonial trade erosion. In 1962, the year of independence, Algeria accounted for 8.84% of French imports, a share that had been stable over the 14-year period preceding independence for which we have data. The share fell by two thirds over the next two decades (to 2.72% in 1984) and another two thirds over the succeeding two decades, reaching 0.96% in 2006. A variety of potential explanations for this fact suggest themselves. First, it might reflect poor economic performance over the last four decades by Algeria, which may have reduced its exports to all markets. Second, Algeria's abandonment of the Franc in 1964 may have raised currency transaction costs. Third, France's participation in GATT and the European Community probably redirected its import purchasing patterns, lowering the share taken by any absolute level of imports from Algeria. Fourth, deterioration of business networks and trade-creating institutions may have raised bilateral trade costs.
Utilizing data encompassing almost every country in the world from 1948 and 2006, we identify the impact of independence based on within variation in bilateral trade. We estimate a semi-parametric specification, dividing years since independence into seven 1 intervals. Unlike the work cited in the opening paragraph, we will take as a given any changes in per capita incomes caused by changing internal institutions. We also control for formal external institutions (membership in regional trade agreements, GATT, and currency unions). This allows us to focus on the effects of unobserved informal external institutions such as the business networks emphasized by Rauch (1999) .
Our results show that three decades after independence, trade between colony and metropole has fallen by more than 60%. Trade between colonies of the same empire falls even more. There is little evidence of corresponding diversion of trade to other countries.
We also investigate the mechanisms that underlie the post-independence erosion of trade with the metropole. We exploit a data set showing the number of French nationals living in different countries which we consider as a proxy for the metropole's social and business network. We find the population of French expatriates in former colonies declines in much the same way as bilateral trade. The shrinking expatriate presence partially explains the diminished trade between France and its former colonies. An alternative explanation of falling trade after separation is that wars of independence caused permanent tradereducing antipathy between the metropole and former colony. Categorizing independence events into amicable and hostile separations, we find that the latter are more immediately destructive to trade but both lead to large trade erosion in the long run.
Countries in colonial empires choose if and when to separate, raising the concern of endogeneity bias. As we discuss in Section 2, historical accounts suggest a significant random component to independence events. Nevertheless, systematic determinants of independence are a possible source of bias. The political and economic attributes of the colonizer (metropole) and colony, as well as the strength of their bilateral association, may affect the likelihood of independence. We remove these factors, however, in specifications that eliminate time-varying country effects and non-time varying bilateral effects. Timevarying bilateral effects remain as a potential source of bias. For example, declining 2 trade prospects may have induced metropoles to relinquish control of colonies. We will argue that our results showing little short-run and substantial long-run bilateral trade erosion subsequent to independence do not support this reverse causation hypothesis.
Instead, they are consistent with the proposition that independence led to deterioration of trade-creating capital such as institutions and networks.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe our panel of independence events and bilateral trade data. Section 3 specifies a gravity model employing country-pair (dyad) fixed effects. Due to the computational difficulties of estimating country-year fixed effects to capture multilateral resistance terms, we eliminate them by implementing a method of "tetrads" that takes the ratio of ratios of trade flows. Our results on the impact of independence on bilateral trade are presented in section 4. The concluding section summarizes and discusses potential welfare implications.
Data on independence and trade
The principal variable of interest is the timing of independence events. We do not consider the end of a military occupation as being sufficient condition for an independence event.
Thus France does not become independent from Germany in 1945 in our data set. Rather, independence arises following a colonial period which should involve long-term, civilian administration that includes significant settlement. Information on colonial relationships comes from a variety of sources but we used the CIA World Factbook as the primary authority for independence dates.
There are 253 country pairs with colonial histories, of which 33 remain current. Figure 1 displays the number of countries that gained independence since 1900, a total of
174.
1 The two main colonizers in this sample, the UK and France, are shown in red and
1 Table 4 in the data appendix lists independence events since 1900 as well as the continuing colonial relationships for which we have trade data. The timing of the independences shown in Figure 1 reflect The data base we compiled is larger than most comparable work using DOTS. Our typical regression includes around 620,000 observations. Glick and Rose's (2002) study of currency unions uses DOTS but has about 220,000 observations in part because their study ends in 1997 and their main specification averages bilateral exports and imports. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) also use DOTS (without averaging) but only at 5 years intervals (9 different years starting in 1960), which reduces their sample to 47,081 observations. As emphasized by Baldwin (2006) , considering the direction of trade is important to maintain a connection to the underlying theory. It is important for us to have annual data to be able to estimate the extent that trade changes in the first years after independence.
Specification
In order to estimate the effects of independence, we need a benchmark for the amount of trade expected had independence not occurred. We will follow the common practice of modeling "expected" bilateral trade using a specification based on the gravity equation.
All the well-known empirical and theoretical formulations of the gravity equation can be represented in the following equation for the value of x ij , the exports from supplying country i to importing country j:
In this equation, S i and M j are indexes of the attributes of supplier i and importer j, and G is a factor that does not vary across countries (but can vary across time periods).
Variation in bilateral trade intensity enters through φ ij . We refer to S i and M j as monadic effects and φ ij as the dyadic effect.
The general approach to estimation is to take logs to obtain an equation that is linear in the parameters.
Then the researcher chooses proxies for the monadic and dyadic effects and inserts an error term to represent remaining variation in trade. The next two subsections explain how we model the monadic (ln S i and ln M j ) and dyadic effects (ln φ ij ).
Monadic issues
In many empirical applications, which we will refer to as the "simple gravity" approach, the exporter and importer attributes are assumed to be given by
j , where N represents population and y is GDP per capita. 4 Plugging in these monadic effects we re-express equation (2) as
Theoretical derivations of the gravity equation imply that the monadic factors also depend on non-linear functions of the dyadic part of (1). This occurs for two main reasons. In The solution proposed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) requires that a structural model be used to specify the monadic effects as a function of GDPs and the dyadic vector. There are three problems. First, the results may depend on the structure. While there are multiple micro-foundations for equation (1), they differ in terms of the underlying monadic terms. Second, the monadic terms depend upon the whole dyadic vector including the "internal" distances of countries. Applications suggest that results are not robust to alternate ways of calculating "internal" distances. Third, the method presents computational difficulties.
An alternative estimates the monadic effects ln S i and ln M j in equation (2) We apply a different approach to estimation. It takes advantage of the multiplicative structure of equation (1) and then takes the ratio of ratios to eliminate the monadic effects (including the multilateral resistance terms). This requires a set of four trading partners. For that reason, we call it the method of tetrads.
Consider four countries indexed i, j, k, and . Using (1), the ratio of i's exports to j over its exports to importer k is given by
We have canceled out G, and more importantly, S i , the exporter fixed effect. The M j /M k ratio remains problematic for estimation however, and we now need an expression parallel to (4) containing M j /M k that we can divide R i{jk} by in order to cancel out these remaining monadic terms. This can be achieved by picking a reference exporter and calculating the corresponding ratio to the same pair of importers:
Taking the ratio of ratios we can define the tetradic term
where the tetrad comprises two exporters, {i }, and two importers, {jk}. Taking logs, we have
We now specify φ ij to show how the r {i }{jk} can be used to estimate the parameters determining bilateral trade intensity. The log dyadic effect is given by
The B ij and u ij in this equation represent respectively observed and unobserved bilateral linkages. Plugging this expression back into equation (7), we have
For binary linkage variables, the sum above can take on five possible values: 2, 1, 0, −1 and −2, depending on the pattern of linkages within the tetrad.
Our approach can be seen as an extension of existing ratio approaches that take advantage of the multiplicative functional form of the gravity equation to get rid of either the exporters' (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002) or importers' Mayer, 2000, and Martin et al., 2008) fixed effects. Combining the two approaches yields a specification free of any monadic term. 5 Two recent papers also employ the ratio of ratios to eliminate the monadic terms. Romalis (2007) estimates the response of US imports from Canada and Mexico to NAFTA tariff reductions. Hallak (2006) uses the approach to quantify the economic magnitude of coefficients obtained from fixed effects gravity equations.
The method presents two special issues. First, one needs to select the reference countries k and in order to do the tetrad calculations. 6 In their single-ratio methods, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Martin et al. (2008) take the United States as the reference country. The EU is the reference importer and the rest of the world is the reference exporter in Romalis (2007) . We employ three pairs of reference countries to examine robustness. First, we take the two big colonizers over our sample, France and the United Kingdom. We then use two of the biggest exporters, Germany and the US.
Finally, we consider two economies that did not have colonial relationships during our sample, Canada and Switzerland.
A second issue concerns the independence of the observations. As represented in (9), the error terms u k , u ik , and u j , appear repeatedly across observations. Indeed, u k is contained in each observation. We will use year dummies to account for u k but are still left with correlated errors as a consequence of u ik , and u j . The appropriate form of clustering is more complex than usual here, since the repeated presences of u ik and u j call for both exporter-year and importer-year clusters, which are non-nested. We therefore use multi-way clustering of the kind described in Cameron et al. (2006) . We implement their estimation method using three-way clustering: it, jt, and ij. 
Dyadic issues
Another concern in this study is that the vector of linkage variables, B ij , is necessarily incomplete. This means unobserved dyadic (ij) linkages will contaminate the error term.
That is, even if we control for importer and exporter effects there are unobserved bilateral influences on both trade and the decision to become independent. With panel data, one can remove the unobserved but fixed component of bilateral linkages using dyadic (country-pair) fixed effects. This identifies the effect of independence based on time series variation. We will therefore also use this type of specification, and follow Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Glick and Rose (2002) who underscore the importance of capturing policy changes using time-series rather than cross-sectional variation.
Finally we need to specify the set of observable linkages between country pairs in our sample. Using abbreviations, we specify the linkages vector in year t as
which controls for distance, common language, having common legal origins in national law, the existence of a historical colonial relationship, belonging to a common regional trade arrangement, both countries belonging to GATT/WTO, belonging to a currency union, and independence. Of these, distance, common language, shared legal origins, and colonial history do not vary over time and drop out in specifications with dyadic fixed effects. We also employ year indicator variables to capture changes in average trade propensities over time.
To measure the effect of independence, we employ seven indicator variables corresponding to years subsequent to independence: 1-2, 3-6, 7-11, 12-19, 20-29, 30-49 and 50 or more years. The advantage of this semi-parametric specification is its flexible treatment of how trade evolves subsequent to independence. For example, if networks underlie the reason why countries with colonial ties trade more with each other, we would expect a gradual decline in these networks over time once independence is achieved. The specification can capture a short-run disruption in trade followed by long-run return to pre-independence levels. It also allows for permanent reductions that are achieved immediately following independence. The omitted category for the independence indicators is the year of independence and previous years. 
Results
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, it is instructive to examine two cases. Instead, we see large gaps on both sides.
France's former colony Ivory Coast trades much more with its former metropole than
France's relative size would imply. The ratio of export ratios to GDP ratios is 79.3 in the year it became independent. By 2006, the ratio had fallen to 5.9. Its imports also begin heavily biased towards France (ratio of 38.6) and, while the import bias also declines, it persists at 11.7 in 2006. On the other hand, Ghanaian trade exhibits bias towards the UK. The ratios of relative trade to relative GDP are 13.4 (exports) and 23.1 (imports) in 1957. Their decline in recent years has been remarkable and the bias has fallen to 1.9
(exports) and 1.3 (imports) in 2006. Even these numbers should be seen as impressive:
Forty-six years after independence Ghana still exports about 90% more to its former ruler than a simple gravity model would predict. From our gravity estimates below, this is larger than if Ghana and the UK belonged to a regional trade agreement, or a currency union. Interestingly, the pooled OLS coefficients for RTA and GATT are higher than in published studies. Rose (2004) tends to find negative and insignificant GATT effects in his study of 178 countries over the 1948-1998 period when dyadic effects are excluded. Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a , b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account correlation of errors within dyads in columns (1) to (3). Columns (4) to (6) use three-way clustering by dyad, i-year, and j-year using Cameron et al. (2006) method.
The number of observations in his study, 234,597 in the baseline regression, is less than half the 618,233 observations in our analysis. Likewise, Baier and Bergstrand (2007 ,   Table 4 , column 2) obtain RTA coefficients of 0.27 for pooled OLS, considerably smaller than our 0.96 estimate. They use 1960 They use , 1970 They use , 1980 They use , 1990 They use , 2000 data and 96 countries and thus only have 47,081 observations. Column (2) takes into account unobserved persistent dyadic influences using random effects. Random effects is a GLS transformation of the data in which each variable z ijt is replaced by z ijt −θ ijzij . Thus the variables are being quasi-differenced by the dyadic means. Ifθ ij = 1, then this specification would be the fixed effects within transformation.
Instead, random effects estimatesθ ij based on the number of observations per dyad and the relative variances of the between and within dimensions of the data. In these estimations the medianθ ij is 0.8, which helps to explain why the results look very similar to those shown in column (3) for fixed effects. Given this similarity, we will not comment on them except for the estimate for colonial history. That variable has no within-dyad variation (it is coded so as to equal one if ever the country pair were in a colonial relationship). To assess the influence of a colonial relationship after a certain number of years, one should subtract the relevant independence coefficient from the estimate of colonial history obtained in this specification, 2.6. This coefficient implies that countries in ongoing colonial relationships have, on average, 13.5 (= e 2.6 ) times more trade than other country pairs.
Column (3) In the final three specifications, the tetrad method removes all (time-varying) monadic effects (e.g., population, per capita income, and multilateral resistance terms). We also employ tetradic fixed effects which eliminate non-time varying bilateral linkage variables.
Looking across columns (4)-(6), regressions that use Great Britain-France, the United
States-Germany, and Switzerland-Canada as reference countries, we find that the signs of estimated coefficients on RTA, GATT, and currency union are the same as those listed in column (3) but the magnitudes vary somewhat. The RTA estimates are smaller than those shown in column (3) whereas the estimates of GATT membership are slightly larger.
The estimates for currency union are quite similar to those estimated by random or fixed effects, but lower than OLS estimates. Table 2 lists estimates of the seven independence variables corresponding to trade at increased intervals since liberation: 1-2 years, 3-6 years, 7-11 years, 12-19 years, 20-29 years, 30-49 years, and 50+ years. Column (1) exhibits the pooled OLS results. For the newly independent (the first ten years), independence is associated with higher trade although the effects are only marginally significant. Evidently, trade between colony and colonizer shortly after independence was higher than colonial trade for existing colonies and colonies that were independent for longer periods of time. Of course, it may be the case that these newly independent countries' trade with their colonizer was higher than average before independence as well. For this reason, we prefer the estimates in the ensuing columns that emphasize within-dyad variation over time. The dyadic and tetradic fixed effects regressions purge observations of average country-pair trade and estimates are based on time-series changes in trade. Given the high values ofθ ij , random effects largely removes mean dyad effects. Note: Standard errors in parentheses with a , b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account correlation of errors within dyads in columns (1) and (2). Columns (3) to (5) use three-way clustering by dyad, i-year, and j-year using Cameron et al. (2006) method. All columns report coefficients from the same regressions as the ones with identical numbering in Table 1 .
Columns (2) and (3) Tables 1   and 2 show very little difference in the coefficients estimated when we omit former Soviet
Republics from the regressions.
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The random effects specification reported in column (2) allows us to compare trade of countries that have been independent for very long periods with those that remain colonies to this day. 14 The effect of being in a colonial relationship is estimated to be 2.605, whereas 50 years of independence has a coefficient of −0.808. Thus, even in the long-run, countries that once had a colonial relationship trade six times (e 2.6−0.8 ) more than other dyads. If one includes the effects of a common language and legal system, which many former colonies retained centuries after independence, the total long-run impact of colonization on trade rises to a factor of 12 (= e 2.6+0.5+0.2−0.8 ).
12 We also estimated a specification with the first four intervals given by 1-4, 5-9, 10-14, and 15-19. The column (3) results become 0.125, 0.138 c , −0.095, −0.284 a , −0.527 a , −0.908 a , and −0.716 a . Thus we still see small positive effects in the first decade, followed by increasingly negative and significant coefficients, with the largest estimated reduction at 30-49 years.
13 Taking column (3) as an example, the independence coefficients are 0.166, 0.087, 0.054, −0.233, −0.536 b , −0.911 a , and −0.725 a . Therefore 30 to 49 years of independence reduces trade to 40% of its initial level in this sample, against 39% when including the former USSR in the regression.
14 Fixed effects drops the colony history dummy because it is not time-varying within dyads.
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Columns (4)- (6) In the cases of reverse causation and cessation of preferential trade policies, we would expect trade reductions to occur soon after the country gained sovereignty. In the preferred estimates in the last four columns of Table 2 that column (3) of Tables 1 and 2 , rather than the tetrad method. The tetrad method eliminates monadic effects, which reflect a country's general trading propensity in a given year. However, it is the changes in a colony's general trading propensity following independence that we intend to capture using the RoW independence variables. The figure shows each of the seven independence intervals as a step function and also shows the 95% confidence interval around the point estimate. The left axis shows the coefficient estimate and the right axis converts the estimate to the ratio of post-independence trade to pre-independence trade.
The coefficients for trade with the metropole are similar to those from Table 2 : After about a decade in which trade does not change significantly, a gradual erosion begins that results in a more than 60% reduction in trade after three decades of independence.
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For siblings we find strong trade erosion as well. In contrast to trade with the metropole, however, statistically significant reductions in trade occur in the first and second year post-independence. The reductions strengthen for two decades before flattening out at almost 80% below the level seen at and before the year of independence. In the case of colony trade with RoW, Figure 5 reveals small, significant increases in trade in the first decade after independence-a 14% increase in the 7-11 years interval-that becomes negative and significant for 20-50 years after independence. In the long run (more than 50 years) RoW trade is not significantly different from the year of independence.
We interpret the gradual trade erosion observed between siblings as evidence that the trade-enhancing "capital" (networks and institutions) associated with empires encouraged inter-sibling trade and that this capital depreciates after independence. The estimates of larger trade contraction for siblings than metropoles is surprising. However, the confidence intervals for metropole and sibling independence estimates overlap with each other 30 years after independence. Contrary to the hypothesis that empires acted as constraints on pre-independence trade diversification of colonies, we find only modest and transitory increases with RoW countries.
Previous research has shown that immigrants are associated with increased trade with their countries of birth (see Gould (1994) and Head and Ries (1998) for early evidence).
The interpretation of this result is that immigrant networks mitigate "informational" barriers to trade. Table 3 focus on colony-metropole relations and the second three columns focus on sibling relations. In all specifications, we exclude observations involving RoW countries (those outside the French Empire).
Columns (1) and (4) Table 1 .
Column (1), where the dependent variable is specified as the log of the expat population, reveals that the number of French living in colonies falls steadily after independence. French expat data is only available after independence so here the reference period is the population of expats 1-2 years after independence. The effects cumulate Note: Expats measured as the log of expat population in the colony in columns (1) and (3) and the sum of the log expat populations in columns (4) and (6). Standard errors in parentheses with a , b and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. All specifications include the full set of controls, dyad fixed effects, and dyad-clustered standard errors. over time, bottoming out 30-49 years after independence, when expat populations are 13% (= exp(−2.058)) of their average level in the reference period.
Trade between France and its colonies exhibits independence effects that are very similar in magnitude and timing to the declines seen for expats. As shown in column (2) of Table 3 , the reduction in trade is strongest after three decades, with the former colony trading just 17% of the level in the reference period. This trade erosion is larger than the amount estimated for the full sample (shown in Figure 5 ), where the estimated coefficients imply that three decades after independence trade has eroded to 30% of the level 1-2 years after independence. Column (3) reveals that declining expat populations account for some of the decline in trade after independence. The coefficient on the log of the expat population is significant and equal to 0.290, implying a 10% reduction in expats leads to about a 3% reduction in bilateral trade. This estimate lies within the range obtained in the immigration and trade literature.
19 The coefficients on the independence intervals fall in column (3) relative to column (2). After accounting for the effect of declines in expats, the reduction in trade due to 30 years of independence falls from 83% to 70%.
The relationships between expats, trade, and independence extend to siblings. Each observation used in the specifications in the last three columns of the 21 Column (4) shows that the redefined variable falls steadily after independence. Recall that we designate the year the first colony leaves the empire as the independence date for the sibling pair. Unlike the colony-metropole regressions in the previous three columns, we do not observe any transitions from 1-2 years of independence to 3-6 years of independence, and thus our reference group in now the period 3-6 years after independence. Columns (5) and (6) reveal that declines in expat populations explain some of the trade erosion between siblings. In column (6), the coefficient on log expats is 0.206, one-third smaller than the coefficient in column (3).
As a consequence, expat populations account for a smaller amount of trade erosion. The reduction in trade between siblings due to 30 years of independence (relative to the 3-6 year reference group) falls from 67% to 63%.
The gradual decline in trade cumulating over three decades, may be a result of a similar declines in business networks, for which expat populations may constitute an important element. dependence. In contrast, it takes more than two decades for amicable separations to lead to statistically significant trade reductions with the metropole. These findings are consistent with our network capital explanation of independence effects. We interpret hostile separations as abruptly destroying social capital between the two countries. In contrast, amicable separations seem to reduce trade via gradual depreciation. 22 We started with information listed in the "Territorial Change" database (Tir, Schafer, and Diehl, 1998) from the Correlates of Wars project and used internet sources (the CIA Factbook, BBC country briefs, and Wikipedia) to complete the classification, shown in Table 4 . 
